How Far Are We From The Slippery Slope? by Trabandt, Mathias & Uhlig, Harald
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2006-023 
How Far Are We From 
The Slippery Slope? 
The Laffer Curve 
Revisited 
 
Mathias Trabandt* 
Harald Uhlig* ** 
* Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany 
** CEPR, Tilburg University and Deutsche Bundesbank 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
ISSN 1860-5664 
 
SFB 649, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
S
FB
  
  
  
6
 4
 9
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
E
 C
 O
 N
 O
 M
 I 
C
  
  
 R
 I 
S
 K
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 B
 E
 R
 L
 I 
N
 
How Far Are We From The Slippery Slope?
The Laffer Curve Revisited∗
Mathias Trabandt†
Humboldt University Berlin
Harald Uhlig‡
Humboldt University Berlin, CEPR,
Tilburg University and Deutsche Bundesbank
This Version: April 3, 2006
∗We would like to thank Alexis Anagnostopoulos and Henning Bohn for helpful comments
and discussions. We also thank Silvia Ardagna, Wouter DenHaan, Michael Funke, Jordi Gali,
Stefan Homburg, Bas Jacobs, Magnus Jonsson, Omar Licandro, Bernd Lucke, Rick van der Ploeg,
Morton Ravn, Assaf Razin, Andrew Scott, Hans-Werner Sinn, Kjetil Storesletten, Silvana Ten-
reyro, Klaus Wa¨lde as well as seminar participants at Humboldt University Berlin, Hamburg Uni-
versity, 3rd MAPMU conference, 2005 CESifo Area Conference on Public Sector Economics
and 2005 European Economic Association conference. Further, we are grateful to David Carey
and Josette Rabesona to have obtained their tax rate dataset. This research was supported by
the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 ”Economic Risk” and by the RTN
network MAPMU (contract HPRN-CT-2002-00237). Mathias Trabandt thanks the European Uni-
versity Institute in Florence for its hospitality during a research stay where part of this paper was
written. This paper has been awarded with the CESifo Prize in Public Economics 2005.
†Address: Mathias Trabandt, Humboldt University Berlin, School of Business and Economics,
Institute for Economic Policy I, Spandauer Str. 1, 10178 Berlin, Tel. +49-(0)-30-2093 1680, email:
trabandt@wiwi.hu-berlin.de
‡Address: Harald Uhlig, Humboldt University Berlin, School of Business and Economics,
Institute for Economic Policy I, Spandauer Str. 1, 10178 Berlin, Tel. +49-(0)-30-2093 5927,
email: uhlig@wiwi.hu-berlin.de
1
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to examine the shape of the Laffer curve quantita-
tively in a simple neoclassical growth model calibrated to the US as well as
to the EU-15 economy. We show that the US and the EU-15 area are located
on the left side of their labor and capital tax Laffer curves, but the EU-15
economy being much closer to the slippery slopes than the US. Our results
indicate that since 1975 the EU-15 area has moved considerably closer to
the peaks of their Laffer curves. We find that the slope of the Laffer curve in
the EU-15 economy is much flatter than in the US which documents a much
higher degree of distortions in the EU-15 area. A dynamic scoring analysis
shows that more than one half of a labor tax cut and more than four fifth of
a capital tax cut are self-financing in the EU-15 economy.
Key words: Laffer curve, US and EU-15 economy
JEL classification: E0, E60, H0
The supply-side economists...have delivered the largest genuinely free lunch
I have seen in 25 years in this business, and I believe we would have a better
society if we followed their advice.
Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (1990)
1 Introduction
This paper sheds new light on an old debate - the shape of the Laffer curve.
In 1974 Arthur B. Laffer noted during a business dinner that ”there are
always two tax rates that yield the same revenues”.1 After being asked,
he illustrated the trade off between average tax rates and tax revenues on
his restaurant napkin. In the 1980’s, the so-called supply-side economists
1see Wanniski (1978).
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claimed that the US were on the slippery slope side of the Laffer curve and
therefore, tax cuts would increase tax revenues. In response to the Reagan
tax cuts, however, government tax revenues dropped. Perhaps then, the US
was on the left side of the Laffer curve.
Thus, one ought to investigate the left side of the Laffer curve more
closely. This is important for two reasons. First, the knowledge of the peak
is important: if it is close, one should be careful about raising taxes to avoid
the slippery slope side. Second, the slope reminds us of the incentive effects
of tax changes. How strong are these effects quantitatively?
The goal of this paper is to examine the shape of the Laffer curve quan-
titatively in a simple neoclassical growth model. We model each economic
area as a closed economy. In the model, the government collects distor-
tionary taxes on labor, capital and consumption and issues debt to finance
government consumption, lump-sum transfers and debt repayments.
We calibrate key parameters to the US and to the EU-15 economy. We
use three different preference specifications to achieve this goal. An impor-
tant quantity is the Frisch elasticity of labor. While it is equal to 3 for a Cobb-
Douglas specification of the preferences in our benchmark calibration, it is
set to 0.3 for a Greenwood-Hercowith-Huffman specification, while both de-
liver the same result on a key tax experiment. We also provide a sensitivity
analysis as well as an analysis for individual European countries.
We show that there exist steady state Laffer curves for labor taxes as well
as capital taxes. This result is robust with respect to variations of preferences
of the household. For consumption taxes, however, the existence of a Laffer
curve depends on the underlying preferences.
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According to the predictions of the model both economies - the US and
the EU-15 area - are located on the left side of their Laffer curves, but the
EU-15 economy being much closer to the slippery slopes than the US.
We examine how the Laffer curves have shifted between 1975 and 2000
for the US and the EU-15 area. We show that the US has moved closer to
the peak for labor taxes while it has hardly shifted relative to the peak for
capital taxes. By contrast, the EU-15 area has moved considerably closer to
the peak for both - labor and capital taxes.
An individual country analysis for the EU-15 area reveals that in terms of
labor taxes all individual EU-15 countries are closer to the slippery slopes of
their Laffer curves than the US. For capital taxes this conclusion holds also
for the majority of countries in the EU-15 area. Finally, the long run slopes
of the labor and capital tax Laffer curves are smaller in all individual EU-15
countries compared to the US.
We quantify the dynamic impact of unexpected and announced tax cuts,
financed by corresponding cuts in government spending. The results for
our baseline calibration are as follows. For US capital taxes, we find that
an unexpected permanent 1 % tax cut corresponds to an endogenous cut of
government spending of 1.6 % on impact and 0.8 % in the long run. A
5-year-in-advance announced permanent 1 % cut of capital taxes leads to
an endogenous increase of government spending of up to 0.4 % during the
announcement period and a cut of government expenditures of 0.8 % in the
long run. For the EU-15 economy, we obtain the same qualitative results.
However, quantitatively, the figures are smaller than in the US. Thus, the
slope of the Laffer curve in the EU-15 economy is much flatter than in the
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US documenting much higher distortions in the EU-15 area.
Following Mankiw and Weinzierl (2005), we pursue a dynamic scoring
exercise. That is, we analyze by how much a tax cut is self-financing if we
take incentive feedback effects into account. We find that for the US model
19% of a labor tax cut and 47% of a capital tax cut are self-financing in the
steady state. In the EU-15 economy 54% of a labor tax cut and 85% of a
capital tax cut are self-financing. Hence, the efficiency gains from cutting
taxes in the EU-15 area are considerably larger than in the US economy.
Thus, a large fraction of the lunch will typically be paid for by the effi-
ciency gains in the economy due to tax cuts. A tax cut may not deliver a free
lunch. But it often delivers a cheap lunch.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two summarizes the existing
literature. The model is derived in section three. In section four we discuss
the results. Finally, section five concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is a comparably large literature on the effects of fiscal policy on ag-
gregate fluctuations and growth.
One branch of literature investigates the effects of fiscal policy in en-
dogenous growth models. Ireland (1994) shows that there exists a dynamic
Laffer curve in an AK model framework. However, using a similar frame-
work, Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) and Novales and Ruiz (2002) find, that
an unrealistically high degree of intertemporal substitution is needed to gen-
erate the desired result that a tax cut is self financing. Agell and Persson
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(2001) argue that the assumption of a constant government share on the
economy drives the Bruce and Turnovsky result. Once this share is allowed
to vary in response to changes in tax rates then there exist dynamic Laffer
curves in AK models for empirically plausible elasticities of intertemporal
substitutions.
Another branch of literature focuses on the effects of fiscal policy in an
exogenous growth context. Baxter and King (1993) were one of the first au-
thors who analyzed the effects fiscal policy a dynamic general equilibrium
neoclassical growth model with productive government capital. The authors
analyze the effects of temporary and permanent changes of exogenous gov-
ernment purchases. Garcia-Mila, Marcet and Ventura (2001) study the wel-
fare impacts of alternative tax schemes on labor and capital in neoclassical
growth model with heterogenous agents. They focus on the redistributional
effects of capital tax cuts. However, in their heterogenous agents framework,
they show that there exists a static Laffer curve. In contrast to the above pa-
pers, our work features a representative agent framework with endogenous
government purchases.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) show that there exists a Laffer curve in
a neoclassical growth model with endogenous labor taxes. However, these
authors focus on the effects of endogenous labor and capital taxes and a
balanced government budget rule and show that indeterminacy can occur
in such a setup. Our paper by contrast features exogenous tax rates which
implies that indeterminacy will not occur. Moreover, we concentrate on a
rigorous characterization and comparison of the Laffer curve for labor and
capital taxes for the US and EU-15 economy.
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Floden and Linde (2001) examine the effects of government redistribu-
tion schemes in the presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity risk
in a parameterized model of the US and Sweden. According to their results,
for labor taxes the US is located on the left side whereas Sweden is on the
slippery slope side of the Laffer curve. Jonsson and Klein (2003) analyze the
welfare costs of distortionary taxation in the US and Sweden. They report
that Sweden is on the slippery slope side for several tax instruments while
the US is on the left side. These papers however do not focus on the Laffer
curve as such but rather briefly mention the implications of their models with
respect to it. By contrast, this paper provides a clear cut and fully fledged
analysis of the shape of the Laffer curve for the US and EU-15 economy.
Prescott (2004a) raised the issue of the incentive effects of taxes by com-
paring the effects of labor taxes on labor supply for the US and European
countries. He finds that Europeans turned to work less than Americans since
labor taxes have risen more in European countries. Our work is in line with
Prescott’s findings. However, for his main result Prescott (2004a) investi-
gates only the labor market relation of his model and based on this he ana-
lyzes the implied incentive effects for labor supply due to labor tax changes.
The present paper analyzes the incentive effects of changes in labor, capital
and consumption taxes in a general equilibrium framework with endogenous
government consumption in the light of the Laffer curve.
Finally, Mankiw and Weinzierl (2005) pursue a dynamic scoring exer-
cise in a neoclassical growth model for the US economy. Dynamic scoring
accounts for the feedback effect from lower taxes to growth via increased in-
centives to participate on the markets. They find that in the US half of a capi-
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tal tax cut is self financing compared to a static scoring exercise. The present
paper extends their work in two dimensions. First, we set up a model that
has alternative features like i.e., consumption taxes and endogenous govern-
ment consumption. Second, we calculate the dynamic scoring effect for the
EU-15 and compare it to the US.
3 The Model
We use a standard neoclassical growth model, extended with fiscal policy.2
In particular, the government collects distortionary taxes on labor, capital
and consumption and issues debt to finance government consumption, lump-
sum transfers and debt repayments. We model the US and the EU-15 econ-
omy each as a closed economy.3 Time is discrete, t = 0, 1, ...,∞.
The representative household maximizes the discounted sum of life-time
utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint and a capital flow equa-
tion.
maxct,nt,kt,xt,bt E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [u(ct, nt) + v(gt)]
2Following Prescott (2004a) we abstract from a monetary sector. See Leeper and Yun (2005)
for an exposition of the fiscal theory of the price level with monetary-fiscal policy interactions and
their effects on the Laffer curve.
3This assumption implies that input factor markets for labor and capital are internationally in-
dependent. Labor immobility between the US and the EU-15 is a well known fact and a commonly
used assumption in the literature. For capital the closed economy assumption can be motivated by
either the Feldstein and Horioka (1980) observation
that domestic saving and investment are highly correlated or by interpreting the model in the
light of ownership-based taxation instead of source-based taxation. In both cases changes in fis-
cal policy will have only minor cross border effects. However, for explicit tax policy in open
economies see i.e., Mendoza and Tesar (1998) or Kim and Kim (2004) and the references therein.
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s.t.
(1 + τ ct )ct + xt + bt = (1− τ
n
t )wtnt + (1− τ
k
t )(dt − δ)kt−1
+δkt−1 +R
b
tbt−1 + st +Πt
kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + xt
where ct, nt, kt, xt, bt denote consumption, hours worked, capital, in-
vestment and government bonds. The household takes utility providing gov-
ernment consumption gt as given.4 Further, the household receives wages
wt, dividends dt and profits Πt from the firm. Moreover, the household re-
ceives interest earnings Rbt and lump-sum transfers st from the government.
The household has to pay consumption taxes τ ct , labor income taxes τnt and
capital income taxes τkt . Note that capital income taxes are levied on divi-
dends net-of-depreciation as in Prescott (2004a) and in line with Mendoza,
Tesar and Razin (1994).
The representative firm maximizes its profits subject to a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction technology,
maxkt−1,nt yt − dtkt−1 − wtnt (1)
s.t.
yt = ztk
θ
t−1n
1−θ
t (2)
where zt denotes total factor productivity which is defined as zt = ξtγt. We
assume that γt follows a stationary stochastic AR(1) process.
4For similar models with valuable government spending see i.e. Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992), Baxter and King (1993), McGrattan (1994), Lansing (1998), Cassou and Lansing (2004)
and Klein, Krusell and Rios-Rull (2004).
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The government faces the following budget constraint,
gt + st +R
b
tbt−1 = bt + Tt (3)
where government tax revenues Tt can be summarized as
Tt = τ
c
t ct + τ
n
t wtnt + τ
k
t (dt − δ)kt−1. (4)
We assume that lump-sum transfers st as well as the three tax rates on labor,
capital and consumption follow exogenous AR(1) processes. To keep things
simple, we assume that government consumption is adjusted accordingly
to balance the government budget. Thus, we assume that government debt
does not deviate from its balanced growth path5 i.e., bt−1 = ψtb¯, ∀t ≥ 0 and
therefore the government budget
(3) can be rewritten as
gt = ψ
tb¯(ψ −Rbt) + Tt − st. (5)
3.1 The Equilibrium
In equilibrium the household chooses plans to maximize its utility, the firm
solves its maximization problem and the government sets policies that sat-
isfy its budget constraint. Except for hours worked, interest rates, taxes and
γt, all other variables grow at a constant rate ψ = ξ
1
1−θ
. In order to obtain a
stationary solution, we detrend all non-stationary variables by the balanced
5This assumption is similar to Lucas (1990). For models with variable debt and alternative
financing forms see i.e., Ludvigson (1996) or Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) and the references
therein.
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growth factor ψt. The technical appendix A summarizes the equations that
describe the stationary equilibrium. For the dynamics, we log-linearize the
equations around the balanced growth path and use Uhlig (1999) to solve
the model. See the technical appendix B for a description of the system of
log-linearized equations.
3.2 Preference Specifications
We consider three different utility functions for the representative agent.
First, we assume a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function, Uc−d(ct, nt) =
(cαt (1−nt)
1−α)1−η−1
1−η as in Cooley and Prescott (1995), Chari, Christiano and
Kehoe (1995) or Uhlig (2004). We consider this as our favorite preference
specification since it is most widely used in the macroeconomic literature.
Second we analyze the model when a power utility function Upow(ct, nt) =
(
ct
ψt
)1−η
′
−1
1−η′ −κ
′ 1
1+φ′n
1+φ′
t is assumed as in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002),
Gali (2002), King and Rebelo (1999) or Merz (1995). Finally, we consider
the case of GHH preferences as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffmann
(1988) or Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1995). In this case utility takes the
following form, Ughh(ct, nt) =
(ct−κ′′ψt
1
1+φ′′
n
1+φ′′
t )
1−η′′
−1
1−η′′ . Note that we
augment POW and GHH preferences by ψt to obtain a formulation that is
consistent with balanced growth.
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3.3 Calibration and Parameterization
We calibrate the model to post-war data of the US and EU-15 economy. For
data on tax rates, we use the results of Carey and Rabesona (2002) who re-
calculate average tax rates on labor, capital and consumption from 1975 to
2000 following the methodology developed by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar
(1994).6 In principle, there are five arguments why we use average tax rates
instead of marginal tax rates for the calibration of the model. First, we are
not aware of a comparable and coherent empirical methodology that could
be used to calculate marginal labor, capital and consumption tax rates for
the US and 15 European countries for a time span of the last 25 years. By
contrast, Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) and Carey and Rabesona (2002)
calculate average tax rates for labor, capital and consumption for our coun-
tries of interest. Second, if any we probably make an error on side of cau-
tion since average tax rates can be seen as as representing a lower bound
of statutory marginal tax rates. Third, marginal tax rates differ all across
income scales. In order to properly account for this, a heterogenous agent
economy is needed. This might be a useful next step but may fog up key
issues analyzed in this paper initially. Fourth, statutory marginal tax rates
are often different from realized marginal tax rates due to a variety of tax
deductions etc. So that potentially, the average tax rates computed and used
here may reflect realized marginal tax rates more accurately than statutory
marginal tax rates in legal tax codes. Fifth, using average tax rates following
6Carey and Rabesona (2002) also develop a new methodology to calculate average tax rates.
We take a conservative stand here and use the part of their work where the average tax rates are
based on the original Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) methodology. However, our results do not
change much when using their new methodology.
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the methodology of Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) facilitates comparison
to previous studies that also use these tax rates as i.e. Mendoza and Tesar
(1998) and many others. Nonetheless, a further analysis taking these points
into account in detail is a useful next step on the research agenda.
All other data we use for the calibration comes from the AMECO database
of the European Commission. Although our data comes on an annual basis,
time is taken to be quarters in our calibration.
13
3.3.1 US Model
In line with the above data on tax rates we set τ¯n = 0.26, τ¯k = 0.37 and
τ¯ c = 0.05. Further, we set b¯ such that it matches the average annual debt to
GDP ratio in the data of 61 %. Hence, in our quarterly stationarized model
we impose ψ b¯
y¯
= 0.61× 4. Further, we set s¯ such that s¯
y¯
= 0.11 which cor-
responds to the ’implicit’ government transfer to GDP ratio in the data.7 See
figure (1) for plots of the time series we used for the calibration of the above
variables. The exogenous balanced growth factor ψ is set to 1.0075 which
corresponds to the average annual growth rate of real US GDP of roughly 3
%. In line with Mendoza and Tesar (1998) and King and Rebelo (1999) we
set R¯ = 1.015 which implies a 6 % real interest rate per year. Depending
on preferences this implies a discount factor β ∈ [0.9915, 0.9926]. Further,
we set the capital share θ = 0.36 as in Kydland and Prescott (1982). In
line with Stokey and Rebelo (1995) and Mendoza and Tesar (1998) we set
δ = 0.015 which implies an annual rate of depreciation of 6 %. Steady state
technology γ¯ is normalized to one. Let us turn to the parameterization of
preferences. We set κ′, κ′′ and α such that the household chooses n¯ = 0.25
in this baseline calibration. This is consistent with McGrattan and Roger-
son (2003) who provide evidence that workers supply on average roughly
40 hours of work per calendar-week.
Our previous choices of steady states and parameter values were moti-
vated by restrictions imposed by the data. However, there are parameters
7Since there is no model-consistent data available for government transfers, we calculate ’im-
plicit’ government transfers that are consistent with our government budget constraint. From the
steady state representation of equation (3) total government expenditures are equal to g¯ + (R¯b −
ψ)b¯ + s¯. Since data is available for total gov. expenditures, gov. consumption and net interest
payments we can easily back out government transfers.
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left in the models that need to be pinned down and that are potentially free.
These parameters are:
η, η′, η′′, φ′, φ′′.
We apply the following discipline in order to pin down these parame-
ters. First, we set η equal to 1 which is in line with i.e., Cooley and Prescott
(1995) and King and Rebelo (1999). This implies a unit elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution with respect to consumption for C-D preferences
i.e., 1/σUScc = − UcUccc¯ =
1
1−α(1−η) = 1.
8 We also impose 1/σUScc = 1 for
POW and GHH preferences and it turns out that we need to set η′ = 1 and
η′′ = 0.855. For POW preferences this is in line with Gali (2002) and for
GHH utility this is roughly in line with one of the experiments in Correia,
Neves and Rebelo (1995).
3.3.2 Frisch Labor Supply Elasticity
In order to discipline our choices for φ′ and φ′′ observe that the model with
C-D preferences is already fully parameterized. That is we are already able
to calculate i.e., steady state tax revenues in the C-D case. Note further that
1/φ′ and 1/φ′′ are the Frisch elasticities of labor supply9 in the case of POW
and GHH preferences. Hence, these parameters should matter a lot for the
labor supply decision of households and in turn for government tax revenues
8Empirical estimates of the intertemporal elasticity vary considerably. Hall (1988) estimates
it to be close to zero. Recently, Gruber (2006) provides an excellent survey on estimates in the
literature. Further, he estimates the intertemporal elasticity to be two. Hence, our choice reflects a
combination of both extremes.
9In general, the Frisch elasticity is defined as σf = dndw
w
n
|U¯c . Hence, from our model we can
derive σf = −Unn¯
(
UcnUnc
Ucc
− Unn
)−1
.
15
if i.e., labor income taxes are changed.
There are two ways to proceed. One is to estimate or calibrate each
parameter specification separately. The different preference specifications,
each with their own specific parameter choices, then deliver potentially rather
different results for the impact of tax changes on tax revenues. In such
a comparison, it is hard to evaluate, how much of the differences are due
to specific features of the preferences, and how much are due to implicit
and possibly unintended variations across preference specifications, due to
the preference-specific parameter choices. A comparison along these lines
provides only limited information, in particular as there is considerable dis-
agreement regarding key parameters in the literature. We return to this issue
when discussing sensitivity to the parameterization, and in particular figure
(3).
We therefore chose to proceed differently. We have chosen a benchmark
calibration for our favorite Cobb Douglas preference specification, and cal-
culated the local marginal impact on total tax revenues from a change in
labor taxation along the steady state Laffer curve. We have then chosen φ′
and φ′′ to keep this quantity the same for the US economy, i.e. such that
∂T¯USC−D
∂τ¯n
=
∂T¯USPOW
∂τ¯n
=
∂T¯USGHH
∂τ¯n
. Thus, the change of government tax revenues
after changing the steady state labor income tax is identical across all three
preference specifications at our baseline calibration. We take the resulting
baseline calibration for the POW and GHH preferences seriously, if the re-
sulting parameters are within the range of values suggested in the literature.
Put differently, our procedure allows us to pin down preference parameters
across the three preference specifications within the range suggested in the
16
literature so that the resulting implications are compatible and comparable.
This has some surprising implications.
The specific value of the Frisch labor supply elasticity is of course of
central importance for the shape of the Laffer curve. Note that in the case
of our favorite C-D preferences, the Frisch elasticity cannot be pinned down
by a free parameter. It is given by 1−n¯
n¯
1−α(1−η)
η
and equals 3 in our base-
line calibration. This value is in line with i.e. Kydland and Prescott (1982),
Cooley and Prescott (1995) and Prescott (2004a). Due to our above calibra-
tion discipline that the slopes of the labor tax Laffer curves should be the
same across preferences we need to set φ′ = 1/3. For POW preferences
this value is roughly in line with Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Thus,
also for POW preferences the Frisch labor supply elasticity is 3. In allowing
for this value for C-D and POW preferences we follow Prescott (2004b).
He surveys the literature and discusses at length that the Frisch labor supply
elasticity should be 3 in macroeconomic models.
However, there is also a large literature that estimates the Frisch labor
supply elasticity from micro data. Domeij and Floden (2006) argue that
labor supply elasticity estimates are likely to be biased downwards by up
to 50 percent. However, the authors survey the existing micro Frisch labor
supply elasticity estimates and conclude that many estimates range between
0 and 0.5. Further, Kniesner and Ziliak (2005) estimate a Frisch labor supply
elasticity of 0.5, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) find an elasticity of 0.8
and Kimball and Shapiro (2003) obtain a Frisch elasticity close to 1. Hence,
this literature suggests an elasticity in the range of 0 to 1 instead of a value
of 3 as suggested by Prescott (2004b).
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As it turns out, our model is not inconsistent with these rather low Frisch
labor supply estimates. Indeed, for the GHH preferences we need to set
φ′′ = 3.879 in order to fulfill our calibration discipline that the slope of the
labor tax Laffer curves are equal across preferences. Hence, this implies an
elasticity of roughly 0.26 and is well within if not on the lower end of the
above micro estimate range. Why then is the Frisch labor supply elasticity
for GHH utility so different from POW and C-D utility if the slopes of the
labor tax Laffer curves are all the same? The reason is in breaking the con-
nection between income and substitution effects for the GHH specification,
and more specifically, the quasi-linearity of GHH preferences with respect
to consumption. This implies that the labor supply decision is entirely deter-
mined by the real wage. Hence, only the substitution effect (and no income
effect) determines the labor supply decision. Since typically, the substitution
effect results in a reduced labor supply in response to a labor tax increase,
while the income effect delivers an increase, and since the latter is missing
in the GHH specification, the Frisch labor elasticitiy is considerably lower.
Conversely, an elasticity as high as for C-D and POW would imply much
larger reductions in labor supply due to the substitution effect which would
imply a flatter slope of the labor tax Laffer curve.
We will pursue a sensitivity analysis in section 4.3 with respect to the pa-
rameters η, η′, η′′, φ′, φ′′ in order to evaluate their implications for the shape
of the Laffer curve.
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3.3.3 EU-15 Model
As an alternative, we calibrate the model to data for the EU-15 economic
area. Appendix A summarizes how we calculate EU-15 tax rates, debt to
GDP and transfer to GDP ratios. For the period from 1975 to 2000 aver-
age tax rates in the EU-15 economy are equal to τ¯n = 0.38, τ¯k = 0.34
and τ¯ c = 0.17.10 In our quarterly stationarized model we set b¯ such that
ψ b¯
y¯
= 0.53 × 4 which corresponds to the average annual debt to GDP ratio
of 53 % in the data. As for the US we calculate the implicit government
transfers to GDP ratio which is equal to 0.19 in the EU-15 economy. Hence
we set s¯ such that s¯
y¯
= 0.19. See figure (1) for plots of the time series we
used for the calibration. The balanced growth factor ψ is set to 1.0075 which
is consistent with the average annual growth of real GDP in the EU-15 coun-
tries of roughly 3 %. All other parameters are set to the same values as in
the US model. Hence, we do not take a stand on structural differences other
than implied by fiscal policy in the US and EU-15 economies. Note that this
implies that the household may chooses a different amount of hours worked
in the EU-15 model compared to the US model due to differences in fiscal
policy. This corresponds to Prescott (2004a) who argues that differences in
hours worked between the US and Europe arise due to changes in labor in-
come taxes. By contrast, Blanchard (2004) as well as Alesina, Glaeser and
Sacerdote (2005) argue that changes in preferences rather than different fis-
cal policies are the driving forces for the observation that hours worked have
fallen in Europe compared to the US.
10Note that due to lack of data Luxembourg is not included in these figures.
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Tables (1) and (2) summarize the calibration and the parameterization of
the baseline models. Additionally, table (3) shows further characteristics of
our different preference assumptions which will be of particular importance
for the dynamics of our models respectively for the slope of the Laffer curve.
4 Results
The following section discusses the results of our models. We concentrate
on the following aspects: steady states and steady state Laffer curves, sensi-
tivity analysis, shifts of Laffer curves over time, joint variations of tax rates,
individual european country Laffer curves, dynamic effects of tax cuts and a
dynamic scoring exercise.
4.1 Steady States
Table (4) compares the government share on GDP of the data and the base-
line models. In the data, the government consumption to GDP ratio is 16.5
percent for the US and 21.3 percent for the EU-15 countries. Our baseline
models predict 15.2 percent for the US and 20.9 percent for the EU-15.11
Although there is some gap we argue that the models are roughly able to
match average government consumption to GDP data.12
11One might wonder, why all three models predict the same steady state ratios. The real interest
rate is the same across models which implies that the capital to output ratio is the same and due to
that all other ratios are the same along our models.
12The match could be improved by allowing for different values for δ or R¯. However, we to not
take a stand on structural differences other than implied by fiscal policy.
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The models are also roughly in line with the total government expendi-
tures to GDP ratio for both - the US and the EU-15. The bigger gap occurs
since in our models, total government expenditures are the sum of govern-
ment consumption, transfers and net-interest payments only. We abstract
from additional expenditures as i.e., government investment, government
military investment and subsidies which certainly affect total government
expenditures in the data.
At this point, we want to emphasize the labor supply decisions of the
households. We set κ′, κ′′ and α in the US model such that the agent chooses
to work n¯us = 0.25. We use the same numbers for these structural parame-
ters as well in the the EU-15 model. It turns out that the household chooses
to work n¯c−d = 0.22, n¯pow = 0.22 and n¯ghh = 0.23 in the EU-15 economy.
Thus, higher tax rates and government shares on GDP reduce the incentive
to work and generate lower labor supply. This result corresponds to Prescott
(2004a) who finds that lower labor supply in the EU countries is due to
higher tax burdens.13
Table (5) summarizes the tax revenue to GDP ratios for labor, capital and
consumption taxes.14 For the US, labor tax revenues are the largest source
of revenue followed by capital and consumption taxes. For the EU-15 labor
tax revenues also contribute mostly to government revenues. Conversely to
13Prescott (2004a) reports in table 2 actual labor supply of Germany, France, Italy, United King-
dom and USA for the periods from 1970-1974 and 1993-1996. Taking the average over time and
over the 4 European countries shows that in these countries labor supply is 14% lower compared
to the US. Our models predict that in the EU-15 labor supply is - depending on preferences -
between 8% and 12% lower than in the US. Taking the average over preferences of our EU-15
models implies that European labor supply is roughly 11% lower than in the US.
14The methodology of Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) of calculating average tax rates allows
to calculate implicit tax revenues to GDP ratios for our three tax rates.
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the US, consumption tax revenues are the second largest source of revenue
in the EU-15 followed by capital tax revenues. Aside from the fact that the
models are able to match this structural difference, the quantitative match is
acceptable as well.
Finally, table (6) compares the steady state consumption, investment and
capital to output ratios of the models with the data. The models understate
the consumption and capital to output ratios but overstate the investment to
output ratio. More importantly however, the US and EU-15 models are able
to capture the relative differences of US and EU-15 data. That is, the models
correctly predict that US consumption to GDP is higher than in the EU-15
area. Conversely, the models also predict that the investment and capital to
GDP ratios are smaller in the US compared to the EU-15 economy.
We conclude that although the absolute match of the models is not per-
fect, the models roughly match the relative differences between the US
and EU-15. Hence, the following results regarding the absolute numbers
of i.e., the peaks of the Laffer curves should be interpreted with caution.
Most insightful will be the relative comparisons of the US and the EU-15
economies.
4.2 Steady State Laffer Curves
The top panel of figure (2) shows steady state Laffer curves for labor taxes
in the US and EU-15 Model. We obtain the Laffer curves by varying the
steady state labor tax rate - while holding all other taxes and parameters
fixed - and then computing total tax revenues in steady state. In order to
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facilitate comparison across preferences and models we normalize steady
state tax revenues by steady state tax revenues obtained for C-D utility at the
baseline tax rate. Three things are noticeable. First, the US and the EU-15
economies are located on the left side of the labor tax Laffer curves for all
preferences specifications. Second, the EU-15 economy is much closer to
the peak than the US. Third, the slope of the labor tax Laffer curves at the
average tax rate is flatter in the EU-15 compared to the US implying much
higher distortions in the EU-15 economy.15 Note that as a consequence of
our calibration/parameterization discipline of section 3.3 the slope of the US
labor tax Laffer curve is locally identical for all preference specifications at
the US average labor income tax rate. For the EU-15 labor tax Laffer curve
this is not the case since we use the same parameters as in the US model.
This implies i.e., different and lower labor supply across preferences in the
EU-15 and hence different slopes of the labor tax Laffer curve in the EU-15.
The mid panel of figure (2) draws steady state Laffer curves for capital
taxes. Here the results are even more striking. Again, both economies are
on the left side of the capital tax Laffer curve but the EU-15 economy is
much closer to the peak than the US. Moreover, the slope of the EU-15
capital tax Laffer curve at the average tax rate is almost flat for all three
preference specifications. Cutting capital income taxes - even to zero as
Chamley (1986) and Lucas (1990) show to be optimal - would imply only
marginal losses in tax revenues.
The bottom panel of figure (2) depicts steady state tax revenues depen-
15Note that there exists a maximum tax rate up to which we can calculate Laffer curves. The
government budget constraint in steady state is given by: g¯ = (ψ − R¯)b¯ − s¯ + T¯ . If tax rates
become very high tax revenues may be smaller than interest and transfer payments and hence,
government consumption would be negative.
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dent on consumption taxes. For C-D preferences there does not exist a steady
state Laffer curve for steady state consumption taxes.16 The income and sub-
stitution effects cancel exactly which implies that labor supply is unchanged
when the consumption tax changes. By contrast, consumption falls but never
to zero since it has a positive value in the utility function. In particular, con-
sumption falls with the same rate as the consumption tax rate rises. Since
labor supply is unchanged capital is also constant and thus tax revenues from
these factors are unchanged. This implies that tax revenues converge to an
upper bound for C-D preferences. In case of POW preferences the param-
eter η′ determines whether the income or the substitution effect dominates
and hence whether there exists a Laffer curve. If η = 1 both effects cancel
exactly and no consumption tax Laffer curve occurs. For η < 1 the substi-
tution effect dominates and hence labor supply and capital fall in addition
to consumption - a consumption tax Laffer curve arises. In case of η > 1
the income effect dominates and labor supply and capital rise while con-
sumption falls - tax revenues converge to an upper bound again. For GHH
preferences, however, there always exists a Laffer curve. The income effect
is zero for this utility function and thus labor supply, capital and consump-
tion fall if consumption taxes rise.
However, across preferences we obtain a mixed result with respect to the
existence of the consumption tax Laffer curve. If anything, the slope of tax
revenues with respect to consumption taxes is steeper in the US than in the
EU-15 model - documenting again higher distortions EU-15 area.
16Note that i.e., τ¯ c = 0.5 is a 50 % tax rate. Hence figure (2) depicts consumption taxes on the
interval from 0 to 1000 %. We also experimented with a maximum steady state consumption tax
rate of 100 000 % but our result that there is no consumption tax Laffer curve for C-D remains.
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4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The labor supply elasticity plays a key role for the shape of the Laffer curve.
For POW and GHH preferences figure (3) shows the effects of different
Frisch elasticities of labor supply ( 1
φ′
resp. 1
φ′′
) on the shape of the Laffer
curve.17 We choose alternative values for φ′ and φ′′ from the literature. I.e.,
Pencavel (1986) estimates φ = 6.7, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000)
choose φ = 1.25 and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) estimate φ = 0.47.
We also experiment with φ = 3. For each of these alternative values we redo
our calibration exercise of section 3.3 (holding η′ and η′′ fixed) and then we
vary steady state tax rates as before.
For POW preferences, figure (3) reveals that the shape of the Laffer curve
changes modestly with the Frisch labor supply elasticity. By contrast, for
GHH utility we obtain dramatic changes with possible peaks at almost the
entire tax range.
Nevertheless, a clear picture emerges. The lower φ′ resp. φ′′, the higher
is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and the earlier occurs the peak of
the Laffer curve. This result is intuitive. A rise in labor taxes reduces the
real after-tax wage. If the household’s labor supply is more elastic with re-
spect to the real after-tax wage, it will reduce its labor supply more strongly.
Therefore, the marginal increase of tax revenues is smaller with higher labor
supply elasticities - the peak occurs earlier.
17We noted earlier that for the C-D case the Frisch labor supply elasticity is determined endoge-
nously. In particular is depends not only on the parameters α and η but also on steady state labor
supply. Since n¯ changes with different tax rates the Frisch elasticity changes endogenously too.
Therefore we cannot pin down the elasticity to one particular value as in the POW and GHH case.
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In addition, we also pursue a sensitivity analysis with respect to η, η′
and η′′. Interestingly, steady state tax revenues in the case of C-D and GHH
preferences are invariant with respect to changes in η and η′′. That is, steady
state labor supply, steady state capital and steady state consumption do not
depend on η and η′′.18 By contrast, in the case of POW preferences steady
state tax revenues depend on η′ via the labor supply decision of the house-
hold i.e., κ′n¯φ′ c¯η′ = (1 − θ)1−τ¯n1+τ¯c
y¯
n¯
. We choose alternative values for η′
from the literature. I.e., House and Shapiro (2004) set η′ = 5, King and
Rebelo (1999) use η′ = 3 in their extended model and Lucas (1990) chooses
η′ = 2. We further experiment with η′ = 0.2 and η′ = 0.5. For each of these
alternative values we redo our calibration exercise of section 3.3 (holding φ′
fixed) and then we vary steady state tax rates as before.
Figure (4) shows that the shape of the Laffer curve for steady state cap-
ital income taxes changes with different values for η′ in the case of POW
preferences. In particular, the higher η′ the later occurs the peak of the Laf-
fer curve. This result is intuitive. The higher η′ the more risk averse is the
household. Due to precautionary savings motives, the household reduces its
capital holdings less in case of a higher η′. Hence, the peak of the Laffer
curve occurs later the higher η′.
18Variations in η or η′′ lead only to variations in β since R¯ is given in our model. However, β
has no effect on the steady state of labor, capital and consumption. Nevertheless, η and η′′ are of
course important for the dynamics of the models.
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4.4 Shifts of Laffer Curves
The preceding analysis is based on the calibration of the models to the av-
erage of taxes, transfers etc. to post-war data. One might wonder, how
the Laffer curves have shifted over time during this period. We investigate
this by calculating the Laffer curves at different points i.e., for the earliest
and latest available observations in our dataset. US data for the year 1975
suggests that we set τ¯n = 0.22, τ¯k = 0.40, τ¯ c = 0.06, s¯/y¯ = 0.11 and
ψb¯/y¯ = 0.48 × 4. Alternatively, for the year 2000 we obtain the following
values for the US: τ¯n = 0.29, τ¯k = 0.38, τ¯ c = 0.05, s¯/y¯ = 0.11 and
ψb¯/y¯ = 0.59× 4. Using these two alternative sets of variables and holding
all other parameters fixed, we calculate steady state Laffer curves for labor
and capital taxes for the US model.19
For our favorite C-D preferences, the left panel of figure (5) shows that
the labor tax Laffer curve has shifted very little and that the US have moved
closer to the peak. By contrast, the capital tax Laffer curve has shifted out-
wards and the US have hardly moved relative to the peak. The outward shift
is mostly due to the rise in labor taxes.
Lets turn to the EU-15 economy. According to the data for the year 1975,
we set τ¯n = 0.34, τ¯k = 0.31, τ¯ c = 0.16, s¯/y¯ = 0.17 and ψb¯/y¯ = 0.31× 4.
For the year 2000 the data suggests τ¯n = 0.42, τ¯k = 0.38, τ¯ c = 0.21,
s¯/y¯ = 0.19 and ψb¯/y¯ = 0.62 × 4. The right panel of figure (5) shows the
corresponding Laffer curves for the EU-15 area. For labor taxes the EU-15
economy has moved considerably closer to the peak and the slope has flat-
19In detail, we use the alternative tax rates and set b¯ and s¯ such that the model matches the debt
and transfer to GDP ratio while holding all other parameters fixed as in the baseline calibration.
Then, we vary steady state tax rates to calculate the Laffer curves.
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tened. Even more strikingly, in the case of capital taxes the EU-15 economy
has moved almost exactly to the top of the Laffer curve. Hence, we conclude
that since 1975 the EU-15 area has moved closer to the peaks of their steady
state Laffer curves.
4.5 Joint Variations of Steady State Taxes
The previous sections analyzed the effects of variations of single steady state
tax rates on steady state tax revenues. Now, we consider joint variations of
steady state capital and labor tax rates. We do so by varying τ¯k = τ¯n
jointly holding all other parameters fixed. Then, we calculate steady state
tax revenues. Figure (6) shows the resulting Laffer curves for the US and
EU-15 Model. Again, the results indicate that the US and EU-15 are located
on the left side of the Laffer curve. However, the EU-15 are closer to the
slippery slopes.
We also calculate steady state iso-tax revenue curves. That is, we work
out the combinations of steady state capital and labor tax rates that yield a
given level of government tax revenues. Figure (7) shows the steady state
iso-tax revenue curves for the US and EU-15 model. Notice that for steady
state labor taxes the EU-15 economy is much closer located to the summit
of the ”Laffer hill” than the US. Moreover, the figure reveals that the ”Laffer
hill” of the US model has a steeper slope compared to the EU-15. That is, in
order to increase tax revenues from say 90 to 100 tax rates need to change
less compared to the EU-15 model.
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4.6 Individual European Country Laffer Curves
In the previous sections we have compared steady state Laffer curves of
the US and EU-15 economy. The latter, however, consists of individual
countries with most probably different fiscal policies. How do steady state
Laffer curves look like for individual european countries? We proceed as
follows. For each individual country we calculate the average over time of
tax rates for consumption, labor and capital. In addition we compute the
transfer to GDP ratio as well as the debt to GDP ratio for each country.
Then we feed our model with these five variables that characterize country
specific fiscal policies. Further, we keep all other parameters unchanged and
then calculate steady state Laffer curves for each country.
The top panel of figure (8) plots the distance in terms of tax rates to the
peak of the steady state Laffer curves for each european country. In addition,
we add the US as well as the EU-15 average. The figure reveals that all
european countries are closer to the peaks of their labor tax Laffer curves
compared to the US. Interestingly, Sweden appears to be on the slippery
slope side of the labor tax Laffer curve.20 For capital taxes the majority of
european countries are closer to the peak of their Laffer curves. Only Spain,
Greece, Ireland and Portugal have a larger distance to the peak than the US.
However, these countries together have only a relatively small share on total
european GDP. For capital taxes the model predicts that the Netherlands,
Finland, Belgium, Great Britain, Sweden and Denmark are located on the
slippery slope sides of their Laffer curves.
20Floden and Linde (2001) report a similar finding for labor taxes. Further, Jonsson and Klein
(2003) report that Sweden is on the slippery slope side of the Laffer curve for several tax instru-
ments.
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The mid panel depicts the distance to the peak of the individual country
Laffer curves in terms of tax revenues expressed in percent of country spe-
cific baseline GDP. For labor taxes the figure shows that tax revenues raise
only modestly for the majority of european countries if they would move to
the peak of their Laffer curve. In all cases the increase in tax revenues is less
than for the US. By contrast, for capital taxes Sweden and Denmark could
raise much more revenues by moving to the top of their Laffer curve since
they are located relatively far on the slippery slope side.
Finally, the lower panel shows the slope of the Laffer curves for a 1
percent increase of steady state labor and capital taxes. We measure the
slope as the change of tax revenues in percent of baseline GDP. The slope of
the US labor and capital tax Laffer curve is steeper compared to all european
countries which documents higher distortions in the EU-15.
The analysis shows that there is considerable country specific variation
within Europe with respect to the shape of the Laffer curve. However, the
EU-15 average economy captures fairly well the relative differences be-
tween the US and Europe. This is especially true for the distance to the
peak for labor taxes. Regarding the distance to the peak for capital taxes this
applies to the majority of european countries with most economic weight
in terms of GDP. Finally, the EU-15 average economy summarizes well that
the slope of the labor and capital tax Laffer curves are flatter in all individual
european countries compared to the US. Hence, in the following sections we
return to a comparison of the US and the average EU-15 economic area.
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4.7 Unexpected vs. Announced Tax Cuts
We now turn to the dynamic properties of the models. In principle, the
government may chooses to cut taxes either unexpectedly or with a pre-
announcement period. Figure (9) depicts the responses of tax revenues to
unexpected and 5-year-in-advance announced labor and capital tax cuts for
the US model.21’22 Appendix B as well as the technical appendix B explain
in detail how we obtain these results. The subsequent results focus on the C-
D utility case. However, the results are robust with respect to our alternative
preference specifications. Some interesting results are worth to be pointed
out here.
First, an unexpected permanent labor tax cut leads to a fall of tax rev-
enues for low steady state tax rates. However, if steady state tax rates be-
come sufficiently large, tax revenues will increase in response to the tax cut.
This is due to the incentive effect. A cut from very high tax levels creates
very strong incentives to work. This enlarges the tax base by more than the
reduction of the tax rate. Therefore, we observe a Laffer curve effect even
for the dynamics.
Second, an unexpected permanent capital tax cut always leads to a drop
in tax revenues in the short-run. However, in the long-run we also observe
a dynamic Laffer effect dependent on the level of steady state taxes. The
21We analyze tax cuts that are symmetric. Giannitsarou (2003) shows that supply-side reforms
can be asymmetric under adaptive learning. The author shows that if a capital tax cut coincides
with a negative technology shock the transition to the new steady state is slower than if the capital
tax cut would coincide with a positive technology shock.
22We have chosen a five year pre-announcement horizon here for illustrative purposes. However,
it also reflects the maximum length of a legislative period in most modern democracies. On optimal
pre-announcement durations of optimal labor and capital tax reforms see Domeij and Klein (2005)
and Trabandt (2006).
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short-run drop - irrespective of the level of taxes - occurs since capital is
immobile and therefore cannot react immediately.
Third, an announced labor tax cut leads to a decrease of tax revenues in
the short-run regardless of the level of steady state labor taxes. This is due
to two effects. The announcement of lower future labor taxes induces the
household to work less and to accumulate less capital. Thus tax revenues
from these two factors decrease. By contrast, consumption rises during the
announcement period due to lower investment. The first effect dominates
the latter and thus tax revenues fall in the announcement period. It should
be mentioned here that House and Shapiro (2004) document a similar ef-
fect. However, when policy is put into place, we observe the dynamic Laffer
effect as before.
Fourth, an announced capital tax cut leads to an increase of tax revenues
during the announcement period followed by the dynamic Laffer effect in
the long-run. The announcement of a cut in capital taxes creates an invest-
ment boom which in turn induces a rise in labor supply. Thus tax revenues
from labor and capital increase. By contrast, consumption decreases in or-
der to accumulate capital. Again, the consumption effect is dominated by
the capital/labor effect during the announcement period. In the long-run,
however, we observe the Laffer effect dependent on the level of steady state
capital taxes.
Fifth, tables (7) and (8) show the evolution of government consumption
for the US and EU-15 model for the baseline calibration. I.e., for US capital
taxes, we find that an unexpected permanent 1 % tax cut corresponds to an
endogenous cut of government spending of 1.61 % on impact and 0.77 %
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in the long-run. A five-year-in-advance announced permanent 1 % cut of
capital taxes leads to an endogenous increase of government spending of up
to 0.38 % during the announcement period and a cut of government expen-
ditures of 0.77 % in the long run. For the EU-15 economy, we obtain the
same qualitative results. However, quantitatively, the figures for unexpected
tax cuts and the long-run values for announced tax cuts are smaller than in
the US. Thus, the slope of the Laffer curve in the EU-15 economy is much
flatter than in the US which again documents a much higher degree of dis-
tortions in the EU-15 area compared to the US.
5 Dynamic Scoring
Our previous results indicate that tax cuts are not fully self-financing in the
US and EU-15 area. However, it is interesting to which extend tax cuts
are self-financing given the positions of the US and EU-15 on their respec-
tive Laffer curves. Following Mankiw and Weinzierl (2005), we perform
a static and dynamic scoring exercise for steady state tax revenues in re-
sponse to i.e., a steady state capital tax cut. Static scoring is obtained from
cutting steady state capital taxes while holding capital, hours and consump-
tion at their steady state levels. Hence, there is no dynamic feedback effect
from lower taxes to i.e., higher capital accumulation. By contrast, dynamic
scoring allows for the feedback effect from lower taxes to higher capital ac-
cumulation and corresponds to the response of tax revenues in our DSGE
model. Hence, χ is the fraction of the static effect that equals the dynamic
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effect i.e.,
∂T¯DSGE
∂τ¯k
= χ
∂T¯Static
∂τ¯k
. (6)
Then, the degree of self-financing can be calculated as 100(1 − χ). We
find for the US model that 19% of a labor tax cut and 47% of a capital tax
cut are self-financing in the steady state.23 In the EU-15 economy 54% of
a labor tax cut and 85% of a capital tax cut are self-financing. Hence, the
efficiency gains from cutting taxes in the EU-15 area are comparably large.
These results are obtained from a steady state analysis and do not take
a transition over time into account. Figure (10) shows the responses of tax
revenues to unexpected and announced labor and capital tax cuts for static
as well as dynamic scoring over time. Again, the plots reveal that the size
of the dynamic feedback effect is considerable. For each point in time we
calculate the proportions of tax cuts that are self-financing. Tables (9) and
(10) summarize our results. It turns out that in the EU-15 area the degree of
self-financing is higher compared to the US at every point in time during the
transition period.
Also following Mankiw and Weinzierl (2005), we calculate the
”Present Value” of the self-financing. To do so, we sum up the dis-
counted changes in the static as well as DSGE tax revenues. As discount
23Note that Mankiw and Weinzierl (2005) report for their model that 17% of a labor tax cut and
53% of a capital tax cut is self-financing. Recently, Leeper and Yang (2006) argue that Mankiw
and Weinzierl’s result that static scoring overestimates the revenue loss hinges on the assumption
that lump-sum transfers adjust to balance the government budget. In particular, Leeper and Yang
show that a bond-financed tax cut can have adverse effects on growth. Interestingly, they show that
when the government consumption to GDP ratio is adjusted to rising debt in response to a labor
tax cut then static scoring underestimates the revenue loss as opposed to Mankiw and Weinzierl.
By contrast, in our experiments government debt is fixed and the level of government consumption
adjusts. We find that static scoring overestimates the revenue loss for labor and capital tax cuts
thereby confirming Mankiw and Weinzierl.
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factors we use the after-tax real interest rates obtained from the dynamics.
Finally, we calculate the self-financing as before using now the previously
calculated discounted sums. For the US model we obtain a ”Present Value”
of self-financing for unexpected labor tax cuts of 19 % and −2.2% for 5-
year-in-advance announced labor tax cuts.24 For unexpected capital tax cuts
the ”Present Value” is 37 % and for 5-year-in-advance announced capital tax
cuts we obtain a ”Present Value” of 48 %.
The same exercise yields the following results in the EU-15 model. The
”Present Value” of self-financing for unexpected labor tax cuts is 53 % and
18% for 5-year-in-advance announced labor tax cuts. For unexpected capital
tax cuts the ”Present Value” is 65 % and for 5-year-in-advance announced
capital tax cuts we obtain a ”Present Value” of 82 %.
Our results show that by any measure there is a much higher degree of
self-financing possible in the EU-15. This shows again that there are higher
distortions in the EU-15 area compared to the US.
To sum up: our analysis reveals that there rarely is a free lunch due to tax
cuts. However, a large fraction of the lunch will be paid for by the efficiency
gains in the economy due to tax cuts. The lunch is not free, but it is cheap.
24The negative number for 5-year-in-advance announced labor tax cuts is due to the fact that tax
revenues fall in the announcement period in the DSGE model but in the static model tax revenues
remain constant at zero. Hence, the discounted sum of changes in tax revenues can become larger
in absolute value in the DSGE case than in the static model case which produces the negative
self-financing number.
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6 Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to examine the shape of the Laffer curve quantita-
tively in a simple neoclassical growth model calibrated to the US as well as
to the EU-15 economy. We show that there exist robust steady state Laffer
curves for labor taxes as well as capital taxes. According to the model the
US and the EU-15 area are located on the left side of their Laffer curves.
However the EU-15 countries are much closer to the slippery slopes than
the US. Our results show that if taxes in the EU-15 area continue to rise as
they have done in the past, the peak of the Laffer curve becomes very close.
By contrast, tax cuts will boost the incentives to work and invest in the EU-
15 economy. In addition our results indicate that tax cuts in the EU-15 area
are to a much higher degree self-financing compared to the US which again
reflects much higher incentive effects from tax cuts in the EU-15 economy
compared to the US. We therefore conclude that there rarely is a free lunch
due to tax cuts. However, a large fraction of the lunch will be paid for by the
efficiency gains in the economy due to tax cuts. The lunch is not free, but it
is cheap.
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Appendix
A EU-15 Tax Rates and GDP Ratios
In order to obtain EU-15 tax rates and GDP ratios we proceed as follows.
I.e., EU-15 consumption tax revenues can be expressed as:
τ cEU−15,tcEU−15,t =
∑
j
τ cj,tcj,t (7)
where j are the individual EU-15 countries. Rewriting equation (7) yields
the consumption weighted EU-15 consumption tax rate:
τ cEU−15,t =
∑
j τ
c
j,tcj,t
cEU−15,t
=
∑
j τ
c
j,tcj,t∑
j cj,t
. (8)
The numerator of equation (8) consists of consumption tax revenues of each
individual country j whereas the denominator consists of consumption tax
revenues divided by the consumption tax rate of each individual country j.
Formally,
τ cEU−15,t =
∑
j T
Cons
j,t∑
j
TConsj,t
τcj,t
. (9)
The Carey and Rabesona (2002) dataset contains individual country data
for consumption taxes. Further, the methodology of Mendoza, Razin and
Tesar (1994) allows to calculate implicit individual country consumption
tax revenues so that we can easily calculate the EU-15 consumption tax rate
τ cEU−15,t. Likewise, applying the same procedure we calculate EU-15 labor
and capital tax rates. Taking averages over time yields the tax rates we report
in table (1).25
25Note that these tax rates are similar to those when calculating EU-15 tax rates from simply
taking the arithmetic average of individual country tax rates. I.e., we would obtain τ¯n = 0.38,
τ¯k = 0.35 and τ¯ c = 0.19.
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In order to calculate EU-15 GDP ratios we proceed as follows. I.e., the
GDP weighted EU-15 debt to GDP ratio can be written as:
bEU−15,t
yEU−15,t
=
∑
j
bj,t
yj,t
yj,t∑
j yj,t
(10)
where bj and yj are individual country government debt and GDP. Likewise,
we apply the same procedure for the EU-15 transfer to GDP ratio.26 Taking
averages over time yields the numbers reported in tables (1), (4), (5) and (6).
B An Analytical Characterization of the Slope
of the Laffer Curve
In this section we derive an analytical characterization of the slope of the
Laffer curve for unexpected and announced labor and capital tax cuts. We
detrend all variables that are non-stationary by the balanced growth path ψt
with ψ = ξ
1
1−θ
. Then, we log-linearize the equations that describe the equi-
librium. Hat variables denote percentage deviations from steady state i.e.,
Tˆt =
Tt−T¯
T¯
. Breve variables denote absolute deviations from steady state,
i.e. τ˘nt = τnt − τ¯n. See the technical appendix for a full representation of the
stationary equilibrium equations as well as the the log-linearized equations.
Without loss of generality we assume all other exogenous processes are at
their steady states i.e., γˆt = 0, τ˘ ct = 0 and sˆt = 0 ∀t.
26Note again, that these GDP ratios are close to those when simply taking the arithmetic average.
I.e., we would obtain an annual debt to GDP ratio of 55 % and a transfer to GDP ratio of 19 %.
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B.1 Unexpected Tax Cuts
For unexpected tax cuts, we assume that capital and labor taxes evolve ac-
cording to: τ˘kt = ρτk τ˘kt−1 + ǫt and τ˘nt = ρτn τ˘nt−1 + νt. Using the log-
linearized system of equations we can solve for the recursive equilibrium
law of motion for kˆt and Tˆt following Uhlig (1999). I.e,
kˆt = ηkkkˆt−1 + πτ˘
k
t + ντ˘
n
t (11)
Tˆt = ηTkkˆt−1 + µτ˘
k
t + ωτ˘
n
t (12)
After some tedious manipulations, we can express tax revenues Tˆt as
follows:
Tˆt = ηTkη
t
kkkˆ−1 +
[
ηTkπ
ηkk
(
ρt+1
τk
− ηt+1kk
ρτk − ηkk
)
+
(
µ−
ηTkπ
ηkk
)
ρtτk
]
τ˘k0
+
[
ηTkν
ηkk
(
ρt+1τn − η
t+1
kk
ρτn − ηkk
)
+
(
ω −
ηTkπ
ηkk
)
ρtτn
]
τ˘n0
(13)
The coefficients in front of τ˘k0 and τ˘n0 can be interpreted as the slope
of the Laffer curve. Suppose we consider permanent tax changes only, i.e.
ρτk = ρτn = 1 and no initial deviation of capital i.e., kˆ−1 = 0. Then, if
‖ηkk‖ < 1 we obtain:
lim
t→∞
Tˆt =
[
ηTk
1− ηkk
π + µ
]
τ˘k0 +
[
ηTk
1− ηkk
ν + ω
]
τ˘n0 (14)
The coefficients in front of τ˘k0 and τ˘n0 characterize the slope of the long
run Laffer curve. Since the coefficients of the recursive equilibrium law of
motion are very complicated functions of the model parameters we rely on
numerical evaluations presented in tables (7) and (8) and figure (9).
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B.2 5-Year-In-Advance Announced Tax Cuts
In order to model announced labor as well as capital tax cuts we replace τ˘nt
and τ˘kt in the log-linearized system of equations by τ˘na20t and τ˘ka20t . Fur-
ther, we add the following auxiliary variables to our system of equilibrium
equations. For capital taxes: τ˘ka20t = τ˘ka19t−1 , τ˘ka19t = τ˘ka18t−1 , ..., τ˘ka1t = τ˘ka0t−1
with τ˘ka0t = ρτka0 τ˘ka0t−1+ǫt. For labor taxes: τ˘na20t = τ˘na19t−1 , τ˘na19t = τ˘na18t−1 ,
..., τ˘na1t = τ˘
na0
t−1 with τ˘na0t = ρτna0 τ˘na0t−1 + νt. This structure implies that an
innovation in say τ˘ka0t in period t = 0 is fully observed by the individuals.
However, it takes 20 periods (5 years) until τ˘ka20t changes in the respective
equations of the system of equations. Thus, the innovation in τ˘ka0t in pe-
riod t = 0 can be interpreted as an announcement that 5 years later capital
taxes will be changed. Again, we use Uhlig (1999) to solve for the recursive
equilibrium law of motion. I.e.,
kˆt = ηkkkˆt−1 +
20∑
i=0
πiτ˘
kai
t +
20∑
i=0
νiτ˘
nai
t (15)
Tˆt = ηTkkˆt−1 +
20∑
i=0
µiτ˘
kai
t +
20∑
i=0
ωiτ˘
nai
t (16)
After some tedious manipulations and using
∑20
i=0 πiτ˘
kai
t−j =
∑20
i=0 πiτ˘
ka0
t−j−i
as well as
∑20
i=0 πiτ˘
nai
t−j =
∑20
i=0 πiτ˘
na0
t−j−i, we can express tax revenues Tˆt
as follows:
Tˆt = ηTkη
t
kkkˆ−1 +
ηTk
ηkk
t∑
j=0
ηjkk
20∑
i=0
πiτ˘
ka0
t−j−i +
20∑
i=0
(µi −
ηTk
ηkk
πi)τ˘
ka0
t−i
+
ηTk
ηkk
t∑
j=0
ηjkk
20∑
i=0
νiτ˘
na0
t−j−i +
20∑
i=0
(ωi −
ηTk
ηkk
νi)τ˘
na0
t−i
(17)
with τ˘na0t = ρτna0 τ˘na0t−1 + νt and τ˘ka0t = ρτka0 τ˘ka0t−1 + ǫt. Equation
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(17) characterizes the slope of the Laffer curve for 5-year-in-advance capital
and labor tax cuts. Suppose we consider permanent tax changes only, i.e.
ρτka0 = ρτna0 = 1 and no initial deviation of capital , i.e. kˆ−1 = 0. Then, if
‖ηkk‖ < 1 we obtain:
lim
t→∞
Tˆt =
[
ηTk
1− ηkk
20∑
i=0
πi +
20∑
i=0
µi
]
τ˘ka00 +
[
ηTk
1− ηkk
20∑
i=0
νi +
20∑
i=0
ωi
]
τ˘na00
(18)
The coefficients in front of τ˘ka00 and τ˘na00 characterize the slope of the
long run Laffer curve. Note that since
∑20
i=0 πi = π,
∑20
i=0 µi = µ,
∑20
i=0 νi =
ν and
∑20
i=0 ωi = ω the long run slope of the Laffer curve is identical com-
pared to the case of unexpected tax cuts (see equation (14)). Again, since
the coefficients of the recursive equilibrium law of motion are very compli-
cated functions of the model parameters we rely on numerical evaluations
presented in tables (7) and (8) and figure (9).
C Tables and Figures
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Table 1: Calibration of the baseline models
Variable US Model EU-15 Model Description Restriction
τ¯n 0.26 0.38 Labor tax rate Data
τ¯ k 0.37 0.34 Capital tax rate Data
τ¯ c 0.05 0.17 Consumption tax rate Data
s¯/y¯ 0.11 0.19 Government transfers to GDP ratio Data
ψb¯/y¯ 0.61×4 0.53×4 Gov. debt to GDP ratio (quarterly) Data
ψ 1.0075 1.0075 Balanced growth factor (quarterly) Data
R¯ 1.015 1.015 Gross real interest rate (quarterly) Data
Table 2: Parameterizing the baseline models
Variable US Model EU-15 Model Description Restriction
η, η′ 1.00 1.00 Det. IES for C-D and POW 1/σUScc = 1
η′′ 0.855 0.855 Det. IES for GHH 1/σUScc = 1
φ′ 0.333 0.333 Inverse Frisch elasticity POW ∂T¯
US
POW
∂τ¯n
=
∂T¯USC−D
∂τ¯n
φ′′ 3.879 3.879 Inverse Frisch elasticity GHH ∂T¯
US
GHH
∂τ¯n
=
∂T¯USC−D
∂τ¯n
α 0.321 0.321 Consumption weight in C-D n¯us = 0.25
κ′ 4.479 4.479 Weight of labor in POW n¯us = 0.25
κ′′ 341.79 341.79 Weight of labor in GHH n¯us = 0.25
γ¯ 1.00 1.00 Technology (normalization) -
θ 0.36 0.36 Capital share on production Data
δ 0.015 0.015 Depreciation rate (quarterly) Data
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Table 3: Implications of preference assumptions.
C-D Preferences POW Preferences GHH Preferences
Theory Calibration Theory Calibration Theory Calibration
US EU-15 US EU-15 US EU-15
σcc =
−Uccc¯
Uc
1− α(1− η) 1 1 η′ 1 1 η′′(1− κ′′
c¯(1+φ′′)
n¯1+φ
′′
)−1 1 0.973
σcn,n =
−Ucnn¯
Uc
(1−η)(1−α)
1−n¯
n¯ 0 0 0 0 0 −κ′′η′′( c¯
n¯1+φ
′′ − κ
′′
1+φ′′
)−1 -0.705 -0.573
σnc,c =
Uncc¯
Un
(1− η)α 0 0 0 0 0 −η′′(1− κ′′
c¯(1+φ′′)
n¯1+φ
′′
)−1 -1 -0.973
σnn =
Unnn¯
Un
((1−α)η+α)
1−n¯
n¯ 0.333 0.278 φ′ 0.333 0.333 φ′′ + κ′′η′′( c¯
n¯1+φ
′′ − κ
′′
1+φ′′
)−1 4.584 4.452
σw =
−Un
Ucψt
(1−α)
α(1−n¯)
c¯ 1.579 1.206 κ′n¯φ′ c¯η′ 1.579 1.206 κ′′n¯φ′′ 1.579 1.206
σf =
−UnUcc
n¯(UcnUnc−UnnUcc)
1−n¯
n¯
1−α(1−η)
η
3 3.596 1
φ′
3 3 1
φ′′
0.258 0.258
Note: σw and σf are not needed to determine the dynamics. These characteristics are listed here for completeness.
σw can be interpreted as the after-tax real wage. σf denotes the Frisch labor supply elasticity.
Table 4: Government share on GDP (in %)
Government Consumption Total Government Expenditures
US EU-15 US EU-15
Data 16.5 21.3 31.7 45.0
Model
C-D 15.2 20.9 28.0 41.5
POW 15.2 20.9 28.0 41.5
GHH 15.2 20.9 28.0 41.5
Table 5: Sources of government tax revenue as a share of GDP (in %)
Labor Tax Rev. Capital Tax Rev. Consumption Tax Rev.
US EU-15 US EU-15 US EU-15
Data 14.9 20.5 8.3 7.5 3.6 9.5
Model
C-D 16.6 24.3 8.2 7.4 3.2 9.8
POW 16.6 24.3 8.2 7.4 3.2 9.8
GHH 16.6 24.3 8.2 7.4 3.2 9.8
Table 6: Consumption, Investment and Capital as a share of GDP (in %)
Priv. Consumption Total Investment Capital
US EU-15 US EU-15 US EU-15
Data 67.0 57.9 17.8 20.6 260 312
Model
C-D 63.9 57.6 20.9 21.5 234 240
POW 63.9 57.6 20.9 21.5 234 240
GHH 63.9 57.6 20.9 21.5 234 240
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Table 7: US Model: dynamic effects of unexpected and 5-year-in-advance an-
nounced permanent 1% tax cuts; C-D utility; baseline calibration.
Tˆt gˆt
t = 0 t = 19 t = 20 t =∞ t = 0 t = 19 t = 20 t =∞
Labor Tax Cut
unexpected -1.89 -1.86 -1.86 -1.84 -3.58 -3.48 -3.48 -3.38
announced -0.34 -1.06 -2.09 -1.84 -0.50 -2.00 -4.39 -3.38
Capital Tax Cut
unexpected -0.64 -0.53 -0.52 -0.42 -1.61 -1.19 -1.17 -0.77
announced 0.07 0.20 -0.60 -0.42 0.10 0.38 -1.46 -0.77
Table 8: EU-15 Model: dynamic effects of unexpected and 5-year-in-advance
announced permanent 1% tax cuts; C-D utility; baseline calibration.
Tˆt gˆt
t = 0 t = 19 t = 20 t =∞ t = 0 t = 19 t = 20 t =∞
Labor Tax Cut
unexpected -0.83 -0.76 -0.75 -0.69 -1.78 -1.56 -1.55 -1.36
announced -0.30 -0.96 -1.15 -0.69 -0.47 -1.91 -2.69 -1.36
Capital Tax Cut
unexpected -0.39 -0.23 -0.22 -0.07 -1.06 -0.59 -0.57 -0.15
announced 0.06 0.20 -0.33 -0.07 0.10 0.40 -0.87 -0.15
Note: Tˆt and gˆt denote percentage deviations of tax revenues and gov-
ernment consumption from steady state. t counts quarters.
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Table 9: US Model: Dynamic Scoring for unexpected and 5-year-in-advance an-
nounced permanent 1 % tax cuts; C-D utility; baseline calibration.
Degree of Self-Financing (in Percent)
t = 0 t = 10 t = 20 t = 40 t = 80 Steady
State
Labor Tax Cut
unexpected 17.5 18.2 18.6 19.2 19.6 19.1
announced - - 8.4 14.3 18.5 19.2
Capital Tax Cut
unexpected 19.5 28.1 34.0 41.9 45.70 46.55
announced - - 24.6 36.4 44.7 46.6
Table 10: EU-15 Model: Dynamic Scoring for unexpected and 5-year-in-advance
announced permanent 1 % tax cuts; C-D utility; baseline calibration.
Degree of Self-Financing (in Percent)
t = 0 t = 10 t = 20 t = 40 t = 80 Steady
State
Labor Tax Cut
unexpected 46.1 49.1 51.2 53.5 55.12 54.40
announced - - 25.4 41.6 52.6 54.4
Capital Tax Cut
unexpected 25.0 44.4 57.7 72.9 83.14 85.05
announced - - 37.8 63.6 81.2 85.1
Note: t counts quarters. ”Self-Financing” is calculated as 1− TˆDSGEt
TˆStatict
.
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Figure 1: Data used for calibration of the baseline models.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Labor Tax Laffer Curve (US Model)
Steady State Labor Tax τ
n
St
ea
dy
 S
ta
te
 T
ax
 R
ev
en
ue
s 
(C
−D
 U
S 
Av
era
ge
=1
00
)
 
 
 US average
OO
OC−D
POW
GHH
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
Labor Tax Laffer Curve (EU−15 Model)
Steady State Labor Tax τ
n
St
ea
dy
 S
ta
te
 T
ax
 R
ev
en
ue
s 
(C
−D
 E
U−
15
 A
ve
rag
e=
10
0)
 
 
 EU−15 average
OO
OC−D
POW
GHH
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
Capital Tax Laffer Curve (US Model)
Steady State Capital Tax τk
St
ea
dy
 S
ta
te
 T
ax
 R
ev
en
ue
s 
(C
−D
 U
S 
Av
era
ge
=1
00
)
 
 
 US average
O
O
C−D
POW
GHH
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
Capital Tax Laffer Curve (EU−15 Model)
Steady State Capital Tax τk
St
ea
dy
 S
ta
te
 T
ax
 R
ev
en
ue
s 
(C
−D
 E
U−
15
 A
ve
rag
e=
10
0)
 
 
 EU−15 average
O
O
C−D
POW
GHH
0 2 4 6 8 10
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
O
O
Consumption Tax (US Model)
Steady State Consumption Tax τ
c
St
ea
dy
 S
ta
te
 T
ax
 R
ev
en
ue
s 
(C
−D
 U
S 
Av
era
ge
=1
00
)
 
 
 US average
C−D
POW
GHH
0 2 4 6 8 10
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
Consumption Tax (EU−15 Model)
Steady State Consumption Tax τ
c
St
ea
dy
 S
ta
te
 T
ax
 R
ev
en
ue
s 
(C
−D
 E
U−
15
 A
ve
rag
e=
10
0)
 
 
 EU−15 average
O
O
C−D
POW
GHH
Figure 2: Steady state Laffer curves.
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GHH Utility: Labor Tax Laffer Curve (EU−15 Model)
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Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis on φ′ and φ′′.
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POW Utility: Capital Tax Laffer Curve (EU−15 Model)
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Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis on η′.
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Figure 5: Shifts of Laffer curves over time. C-D utility.
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Figure 6: Steady state Laffer curve for capital and labor taxes (τ¯ k = τ¯n).
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Figure 7: Steady state iso-tax revenue curves for capital and labor taxes; C-D
utility; Baseline calibration with US and EU-15 steady state tax revenues=100.
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Figure 8: Individual european country labor and capital tax Laffer curves (C-D
utility, steady state). The upper two panels show the distance to the peak of Laffer
curves measured either in tax units or tax revenues in percent of baseline GDP.
The lower panel depicts the slope of the Laffer curves measured as the change of
tax revenues in percent of baseline GDP in response to a 1 percent steady state tax
increase.
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Figure 9: US Model: Dynamic effects of unexpected and 5-year-in-advance an-
nounced permanent 1 % tax cuts; Different steady state tax rates; C-D utility.
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Figure 10: Dynamic vs. static effects of unexpected and 5-year-in-advance an-
nounced permanent 1 % tax cuts; baseline calibration; C-D utility.
Technical Appendix
A Stationary Equilibrium
We detrend all variables that are non-stationary by the balanced growth path
ψt with ψ = ξ
1
1−θ
. I.e., ct = c˜tψt, xt = x˜tψt, yt = y˜tψt, gt = g˜tψt,
st = s˜tψ
t
, Tt = T˜tψ
t
, kt−1 = k˜t−1ψ
t
. All stationary variables like taxes,
interest rates, hours worked and the cyclical component of technology γt
are not detrended. I.e., nt = n˜t, γt = γ˜t, Rt = R˜t, Rbt = R˜bt , τnt = τ˜nt ,
τkt = τ˜
k
t , τ
c
t = τ˜
c
t . The following equations describe the stationary equilib-
rium:
Households labor supply decision:
−
Un˜(t)
Uc˜(t)ψt
= (1− θ)
1− τ˜nt
1 + τ˜ ct
y˜t
n˜t
(19)
Households Euler equation for capital:
βEt
[
Uc˜(t+ 1)
Uc˜(t)
1 + τ˜ ct
1 + τ˜ ct+1
R˜t+1
]
= 1 (20)
Households Euler equation for government bonds:
βEt
[
Uc˜(t+ 1)
Uc˜(t)
1 + τ˜ ct
1 + τ˜ ct+1
R˜bt+1
]
= 1 (21)
Capital accumulation equation:
ψk˜t = (1− δ)k˜t−1 + x˜t (22)
Real return on capital:
R˜t = (1− τ˜
k
t )(θ
y˜t
k˜t−1
− δ) + 1 (23)
Aggregate resource constraint:
c˜t + g˜t + x˜t = y˜t (24)
Firms production function:
y˜t = γ˜tk˜
θ
t−1n˜
1−θ
t (25)
Government tax revenues:
T˜t = τ˜
c
t c˜t + (1− θ)τ˜
n
t y˜t + τ˜
k
t (θ
y˜t
k˜t−1
− δ)k˜t−1 (26)
Government budget constraint:
g˜t = b¯(ψ − R˜
b
t) + T˜t − s˜t (27)
Exogenous AR(1) processes:
{τ˜ ct , τ˜
n
t , τ˜
k
t , s˜t, γ˜t} (28)
After assigning steady state values for tax rates, technology, transfers
and debt, equations (19) to (27) determine the steady state for all other vari-
ables.
B Log-linear Equations
Hat variables denote percentage deviations from steady state. I.e., yˆt =
yt−y¯
y¯
. Breve variables denote absolute deviations from steady state, e.g.
τ˘nt = τ
n
t − τ¯
n
. The following equations determine the log-linear dynamics
of the model:
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Households labor supply decision:
(1 + σcn,n+ σnn)nˆt = yˆt− (σcc+ σnc,c)cˆt−
1
1− τ¯n
τ˘nt −
1
1 + τ¯ c
τ˘ ct (29)
Households Euler equation for capital:
Et
[
Rˆt+1 − σcc(cˆt+1 − cˆt)− σcn,n(nˆt+1 − nˆt)−
1
1 + τ¯c
(τ˘ ct+1 − τ˘
c
t )
]
= 0
(30)
Households Euler equation for government bonds:
Et
[
Rˆbt+1 − σcc(cˆt+1 − cˆt)− σcn,n(nˆt+1 − nˆt)−
1
1 + τ¯c
(τ˘ ct+1 − τ˘
c
t )
]
= 0
(31)
Capital accumulation equation:
ψkˆt = (1− δ)kˆt−1 + (ψ − 1 + δ)xˆt (32)
Real return on capital:
R¯Rˆt =
(
R¯− 1 + δ(1− τ¯k)
)
(yˆt − kˆt−1)−
R¯− 1
1− τ¯k
τ˘kt (33)
Aggregate resource constraint:
(1− ξ −
g¯
y¯
)cˆt +
g¯
y¯
gˆt + ξxˆt = yˆt (34)
Firms production function:
yˆt = γˆt + θkˆt−1 + (1− θ)nˆt (35)
Government tax revenues:
T¯
y¯
Tˆt = (1− ξ −
g¯
y¯
)(τ¯ ccˆt + τ˘
c
t ) + (1− θ)τ˘
n
t + (τ¯
n(1− θ) + τ¯kθ)yˆt
+
(
θ −
δξ
ψ − 1 + δ
)
τ˘kt −
τ¯kδξ
ψ − 1 + δ
kˆt−1 (36)
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Government budget constraint:
g¯
y¯
gˆt =
T¯
y¯
Tˆt −
b¯
y¯
R¯bRˆbt −
s¯
y¯
sˆt (37)
Exogenous AR(1) processes:
{τ˘ ct , τ˘
n
t , τ˘
k
t , sˆt, γˆt}
with σcc = −Uccc¯Uc , σcn,n =
−Ucnn¯
Uc
, σnn =
Unnn¯
Un
, σnc,c =
Uncc¯
Un
and
ξ = (ψ−1+δ)θ(1−τ¯
k)
R¯−1+δ(1−τ¯k)
. Equations (29) to (37) plus the exogenous shocks de-
termine the dynamics of the model which can be solved with Uhlig (1999).
In order to determine the dynamics of the models, we need the following
15 parameters respectively steady state variables:
σcc, σcn,n, σnn, σnc,c, τ¯
c, τ¯n, τ¯k, ψ, δ, θ, R¯, g¯
y¯
, T¯
y¯
, b¯
y¯
, s¯
y¯
.27
Some of these 15 parameters are free whereas others are tight down
by the data or the model. Following tables (1) and (2) the data restricts
τ¯ c, τ¯n, τ¯k, ψ, R¯, δ, θ. Table (3) reveals that σcc, σcn,n, σnn, σnc,c are func-
tions of other parameters and steady state variables. I.e., for C-D utility we
obtain two new parameters - η and α. However, the parameter α must be
used to pin down n¯us = 0.25 for the baseline calibration. It turns out that
for the case of C-D utility only η is a free parameter. Likewise for POW and
GHH, κ′ and κ′′ pin down n¯us = 0.25 so that free parameters in these cases
are η′, η′′, φ′ and φ′′.
Once we know n¯ in our models we can calculate y¯ and hence from equa-
27Note that in equilibrium Rt = Rbt and thus R¯ = R¯b.
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tions (22), (23), (24), (26) and (27), we can derive
g¯
y¯
=
1
1 + τc
(
b¯
y¯
(ψ − R¯) + τ¯ c(1− ξ) + (1− θ)τ¯n + τ¯k(θ −
δξ
ψ − 1 + δ
)−
s¯
y¯
)
(38)
and as well as
T¯
y¯
=
b¯
y¯
(R¯− ψ) +
g¯
y¯
+
s¯
y¯
(39)
which pin down g¯
y¯
and T¯
y¯
. However, our choice for b¯ as well as s¯ is restricted
by the fact that for the baseline calibration b¯
y¯
as well as s¯
y¯
must match the
data as given in table (1).
To summarize η, η′, η′′, φ′ and φ′′ are the only free parameters in our
models. However, as outlined in section 3.3 we set η, η′ and η′′ such that
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is unity. In addition we set φ′ and
φ′′ such that ∂T¯
US
C−D
∂τ¯n
=
∂T¯USPOW
∂τ¯n
=
∂T¯USGHH
∂τ¯n
. As a consequence of our calibra-
tion/parameterization discipline table (3) reveals that σcc, σcn,n, σnn, σnc,c
are identical for C-D and POW utility for the US model. Hence, the dy-
namics are locally identical for these models. By contrast, for GHH prefer-
ences only σcc = 1 is identical with the other preference specifications and
hence the dynamics will not be identical with the other preferences in gen-
eral. However, implied by our calibration/parameterization discipline that
∂T¯USGHH
∂τ¯n
=
∂T¯USC−D
∂τ¯n
we know that for labor income tax cuts the dynamics will
be identical with the other preferences.
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